What we think we are and how we value human life are linked. Quaker philosopher Elton Trueblood saw the linkage and its implications. He wrote:

A quarter of a century ago [1944] a few of us began to say that faith in the possibility of a cut-flower civilization is a faith which is bound to fail. What we meant was that it is impossible to sustain certain elements of human dignity, once these have been severed from their cultural roots. The sorrowful fact is that, while the cut flowers seem to go on living and may even exhibit some brightness for a while, they cannot do so permanently, for they will eventually wither and be discarded. The historical truth is that the chief sources of the concepts of the dignity of the individual and equality before the law are found in the Biblical heritage. Apart from the fundamental convictions of that heritage, symbolized by the idea that every man is made in the image of God, there is no adequate reason for accepting the concepts mentioned. Since human beings are often far from admirable in their actual behavior, man’s dignity is fundamentally derivative in nature.¹⁶

The cut flower analogy is a startling one. Who hasn’t seen a bunch of flowers left too long in the bowl? The petals turn brown and start falling off. The stems start to droop. Not a pretty sight.

Ideas matter. If I see other human beings as cosmic accidents, my valuation of them, and of myself, shows it. But if I see both them and me as being in the image of God, it makes a difference. Atheistic philosopher Jean Paul Sartre shows us the difference when he describes humanity in these terms: “Man is a useless passion. It is meaningless that we live and it is meaningless that we die.”¹⁷ Secular ethicist Peter Singer argues for a similar view, when he maintains that being human gives no superior moral status and that human beings are not all equal in moral value. He writes:

Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans.¹⁸